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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, SfATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT R. WILBURN, 
Applicant/Appellant, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND 
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 860202-CA 
Category No. 6 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GILBERT R. WILBURN 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-90 (1953 as amended) 
states that no agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
compensation under the Utah Workers Compensation Act shall be 
valid. In accordance with case law interpreting this 
provision, settlements should only be allowed where the issue 
of compensability is truly doubtful. Furthermore, any 
agreement which purports to settle an injured worker's claim to 
worker's compensation benefits should be strictly construed 
according to its express terms so that no inadvertent waivers 
occur. Inasmuch as a settlement agreement is a contract, its 
scope and effect must be interpreted in 
principles of contract law. The interpretation of a contract 
is a question of law for determination by the Court. In the 
case of an integrated contract unambiguous on its face, the 
accordance with general 
meaning of the document is to be determined solely from the 
four corners of the document itself. Furthermore, in the event 
of facial ambiguities within the document, the rules of 
construction require resolution in favor of the non-drafting 
party. 
In the instant case, the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement executed by the applicant is invalid inasmuch as the 
compensability of Mr. Wilburn's injury was not seriously in 
doubt. (See copy of Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.) Furthermore, the 
Administrative Law Judge improperly relied on parol evidence 
presented at the time of the hearing to vary the express terms 
of the written document. Because the interpretation of a 
contract is a question of law, and because the issue presented 
on appeal involves the interpretation of a contract, this court 
has original jurisdiction to review the evidence and make its 
own finding as to the effect of the agreement at issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPENSABLE NATURE OF MR. WILBURN'S INDUSTRIAL 
INJURY WAS NOT DOUBTFUL AT THE TIME THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED AND EXECUTED. 
Respondents allege that appellant would have the 
Court find all worker's compensation settlement agreements to 
be invalid in view of the statutory prohibition against waivers 
found in U.C.A. §35-1-90. This allegation is misleading and 
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seriously misconstrues appellant's position. It is not 
contested and, in fact, Mr. Wilburn agrees with the position 
espoused by the respondents that the settlement of disputed 
industrial claims is desirable and should be encouraged. 
However, because of the statutory prohibition against waivers, 
such settlements should only be encouraged under appropriate 
circumstances, namely where the compensable nature of the 
worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover 
is doubtful. See Brigham Young University v. Industrial 
Commission, 279 P. 889 (Utah 1929). Where compensability is 
not a genuine matter of dispute, settlement is inappropriate 
and should not be allowed. Furthermore! where settlement is 
appropriate, any documents executed in furtherance of the 
settlement should be strictly construed 
express terms so that only those claims 
identified are compromised. This requirement, rather than 
according to their 
and rights specifically 
undermining the settlement process as alleged by respondents, 
would simply encourage careful drafting|so that all parties are 
aware of the full effect of any agreement between them. 
At the time the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
in question was negotiated, the term "accident" was defined for 
purposes of worker's compensation law as follows: 
It [accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. . . 1 [T]his is not 
necessarily restricted to some single 
incident which happened suddenly at one 
particular time and does not preclude the 
possibility that due to exertion, stress or 
other repetitive cause, a climax might be 
reached in such a manner as to properly fall 
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within the definition of an accident as just 
stated above. However, such an occurrence 
must be distinguished from gradually 
developing conditions which are classified as 
occupational diseases and which are not 
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2 
of Title 35 (Sections 35-2-1, et. seq.)/ 
U.C.A. 1953. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202, 203 (1965). The events giving rise to Mr. Wilburn's 
industrial injury clearly fall within the parameters of the 
definition set forth above. At the time of his industrial 
injury, appellant was working for respondent Interstate 
Electric as a heavy duty mechanic repairing and overhauling, 
among other things, portable power plants. On the day he was 
injured Mr. Wilburn attempted to lift a portable power plant 
weighing approximately 100 pounds from the floor to his work 
bench so that he could commence its repair. (R. at 350.) This 
particular power plant had a handle on it so that instead of 
lifting it from the front as he generally did, Mr. Wilburn 
bent over sideways and lifted the plant with one hand from his 
side. (R. at 355.) After lifting the plant, he felt a sharp 
pain in his back. (R. at 54, 55.) In view of the amount of 
weight Mr. Wilburn was lifting, the unusual manner in which 
he attempted to make the lift, and the immediate pain he 
experienced in carrying out this activity, Mr. Wilburn's 
injury on April 14, 1980 unquestionably constituted an 
"unanticipated and unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of 
events." 
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Appellant's position that the events leading to his 
industrial injury unquestionably constitute a compensable 
industrial accident is further supported by case law applying 
the Carling definition. For example, ip. Kaiser Steel 
Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P. 2d 888 (l[jtah 1981), benefits 
were awarded to an employee who suffered a back injury while 
shoveling rock onto a conveyer belt. The employee had 
testified at the hearing that as he was shoveling, he 
experienced a catch in his back. He al^o stated that he could 
identify no unusual incident such as breaking a shovel or 
slipping on a rock that precipitated his back problem. 
Additionally, the record indicated that the applicant had a 
significant history of prior back problems. In affirming the 
Commission's award of benefits, the Utaji Supreme Court stated: 
The applicant's history of woirk-related 
accidents and his medical condition showed a 
job-induced preexisting condition which 
could have been added to or aggravated, by 
the work-related incident that occurred on 
January 5, 1979, or which could have reached 
what this Court has referred 
due to 'exertion, stress, or 
cause . . . in such manner asl 
fall within the definition ofl 
. '. (Citation omitted.) 
|to as a 'climax' 
other repetitive 
to properly 
an accident . . 
Id. at 892. 
The Court also found a compensable industrial 
accident in the case of Painter Motor Company v. Ostler, 
617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). In Painter, Ithe applicant had been 
climbing a ladder and drilling holes for the installation of 
electrical boxes. This activity required him to hold a large 
drill up and away from his body. Afteij doing this work for 
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some time, the applicant became aware of intensifying back and 
shoulder pain. Approximately four months later while moving 
boxes of parts at his employer's place of business, the 
employee again experienced pain in his back for which he 
eventually underwent surgery. Following his surgery, the 
applicant filed an application for benefits which was denied by 
the Administrative Law Judge. The Commission reversed the 
decision of the ALT following a Motion for Review by the 
applicant and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of 
the Commission; in so doing it stated: 
We have previously defined the term 
'accident' as an unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence different from what would normally 
be expected to occur in the usual course of 
events. Thus, if an employee incurs 
unexpected injuries, including internal 
failures, caused by the duties of his 
employment, he is eligible for compensation 
under §35-1-45. (Footnote omitted.) 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. at 976. 
The broad manner in which the definition of 
"accident1" was being applied by the Court at the time the 
respondents raised the issue of "no accident" to Mr. Wilburn 
is especially evident in its decision in Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). In Schmidt, 
the applicant's employment required him to move heavy pieces of 
steel either alone or with the aid of fellow employees. After 
several months of work, the applicant began experiencing 
significant problems with his back. Because he could not 
specify a particular time or occurrence giving rise to his then 
present back problems, the Administrative Law Judge concluded 
6 
he was not entitled to compensation. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the finding of the Administrative Law Judge and 
remanded the case to the Commission fot a determination on the 
issue of medical causation only. In doing so, it stated: 
In this jurisdiction, it is settled beyond 
question an internal failure 'brought about by 
exertion in the course of employment may be 
an accident within the meaning of 35-1-45, 
without the requirement that the injury 
result from some incident which happened 
suddenly and is identifiable jat a definite 
time and place. . . . 
It is equally well settled the injury 
received may be accidental eyen though the 
exertion is that required in 
course of employment. If an 
the ordinary 
employee incurs 
unexpected injuries, including "internal" 
failures, caused by the ordinary duties of 
his employment, he is eligible for 
compensation under 35-1-45. (Footnotes 
omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
Schmidt at 695. 
Respondents contend they wer^ justified in raising 
the no accident defense because Mr. Wi]Jburn was not engaged 
in any unusual activity at the time hi^ injury occurred. 
However, as noted in the decision in Schmidt, it was well 
settled by the year 1984 that an injury could be accidental 
even though it was caused by the ordinary duties of 
employment. Furthermore, even if some rcype of unusual activity 
were arguably required as contended by Respondents, Mr. 
Wilburn's injury met the requirements o|f a compensable 
accident. This contention is supported! by the recorded 
statement taken by Libby Lowther, an adjuster for National 
Union, shortly after the accident. Therein Ms. Lowther 
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specifically asked Mr. Wilburn if there was anything unusual 
about his activities on the day of his injury. He replied that 
he generally lifted the power plants he was going to work on 
from the front because they did not have any handles. In this 
particular case, however, he lifted the plant from his side 
because it happened to have a handle on it. It was this manner 
of lifting that resulted in his injury. (R. at 355.) 
The cases cited by respondents in favor of their 
position that the compensability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was 
legitimately in dispute are distinguishable from Mr. 
Wilburn1s case. For example, in Church of Jesus Christ, 
Etc. v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (1979), the 
applicant had experienced no pain at all while performing his 
regular employment duties. It was only when he stood up 
suddenly to answer the telephone that he felt pain in his 
back. Mr. Wilburn, on the other hand, was unquestionably 
engaged in the duties of his employment when he suffered his 
injury. Furthermore, the manner in which he attempted to lift 
the power plant to his workbench so that he could repair it was 
unusual and directly led to his injury. 
In the case of Farmer's Grain Co-Op v. Mason, 606 
P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) cited by respondents, the applicant 
noticed a gradual onset of back pain on two different occasions 
after unloading 100 pound bags of whey. After the second 
incident, the pain did not subside, and he thereafter applied 
for benefits. The applicant had a significant history of back 
problems and the medical panel chairman who examined the 
8 
applicant stated in the panel report thjat the increased 
injuries the applicant sustained would 
without trauma, on or off the job, and 
|have occurred "with or 
from ordinary 
activities; and that he would have developed back problems over 
a period of time in his work regardlesd of any trauma." Id. 
at 23 9. There is no such evidence tha*q would support a finding 
of no accident in the instant case. Although Mr. Wilburn 
admittedly had a prior back problem, hq had never missed work 
as a result of it and he had only sought medical treatment for 
his back on one occasion prior to his 1|980 injury (R. at 53, 
82-83, 125.) 
The cases of Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 
642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) and Redman Warehousing Corporation 
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 39|8, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) 
are also distinguishable from the facts| herein. In Sabo's, 
the applicant bent over to lift a box o|f twelve clock radios 
and found he could not straighten up. From the facts 
described, it does not appear that any bffort other than 
bending over had been exerted. In sustaining the Commission's 
holding of no accident, the Court specifically stated: 
[I]t appear[ed] to be mere coincidence 
that defendant's injury or malfunction 
occurred at work. . . . Probf of the 
causal relationship of duties, of employment 
to unexpected injury is simply lacking. 
Id. at 726. Likewise, in Redman, the applicant first 
experienced back pain after simply sitting and driving his 
truck. No particular exertion or stress could be identified as 
the precipitating factor of his injury. The Court, therefore, 
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held that the events leading to the applicant's injury did not 
constitute an accident that caused an injury. In the 
instant case, however, there was a specific identifiable 
incident leading to Mr. Wilburn's injury. Furthermore, the 
medical evidence available specifically established that at 
least a portion of Mr. Wilburn's resulting disability was 
directly attributable to the industrial event. All of this 
information was available to the respondents prior to the time 
they raised the issue of no accident. It is obvious from the 
case law that was in existence that the compensable nature of 
Mr. Wilburn's injury was not, in fact, subject to legitimate 
dispute at the time the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was 
negotiated. Furthermore, because compensability was not a 
legitimate issue in Mr. Wilburn's case, the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement is invalid and should not be allowed to 
stand as a bar to Mr. Wilburn's current claim. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WHERE THE QUESTION AT ISSUE 
IS A QUESTION OF LAW AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF A CONTRACT IS A QUESTION OF LAW. 
Mr. Wilburn does not contest the standard of review 
cited by respondents by which this court is bound in reviewing 
the findings of the Commission on questions of fact. However, 
the issue presented herein is not a question of fact, rather, 
it is a question of law. The standard of review to be applied 
in evaluating Commission decisions on questions of law is 
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identified in Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 
P. 2d 779 (Utah 1984). In Dean Evans the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
In reviewing the Commission's 
interpretations of general questions of law, 
we apply a correction-of-error standard, 
with no deference given to the Commission's 
interpretations. (Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 782. See also Board of Education of Alpine 
School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 
issue P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah, 1984). The  
involves the interpretation of a 
Agreement executed by Mr. Wilburn and 
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone an4 
Compromi 
the 
51 (Ut. 1984) and 
on appeal herein 
se and Settlement 
respondents. In 
Telegraph Company, 
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
ff[T]he interpretation of a contract is a question of law, to be 
decided by the judge." It then added: 
It is true that some opinions 
qualify that rule by implying 
limited to circumstances whe^e 
ambiguity or no 'room for unclerta 
And some decisions have reversed 
judgments where the contract 
and remanded for taking evidelnce 
findings on the intent of the 
seem to 
that it is 
there is no 
inty.' 
summary 
jwas ambiguous 
and making 
parties. 
However, our decisions hold that whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law 
which the court must decide before it tak¥s 
any evidence in clarification. More" 
importantly, our more recent casesHiold 
that even the resolution of cpntract 
ambiguities is a question of law for the 
court. (Emphasis added)(Footnotes 
omitted.) 
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The same conclusion reached in Morris was also reached in 
Overson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1978). In Overson the court made the following 
observation: 
The accepted principle is that the 
interpretation of a contract's language is 
usually a law matter. This principle was 
articulated in the case of Central Credit 
Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson [7 
Wash.App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972)] as 
follows: 
Interpretation of a written 
contract is usually a question 
of law for the court. If its 
terms are clear and 
unambiguous, summary judgment 
is proper. Even where some 
ambiguity exists in the 
contract, resolution of the 
ambiguity is still a question 
of law for the court, unless 
contradictory evidence is 
presented to clarify the 
ambiguity. (Footnote omitted.) 
Overson at 151. See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). 
Because the question at issue herein is one of 
interpretation of a fully-integrated written contract and 
because the interpretation of an integrated written contract is 
a question of law, this court's review is not limited to a 
determination of whether the Commission's findings are 
supported by substantial competent evidence. Rather this court 
is entitled to review the evidence anew and make its own 
determination as to whether the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement executed by the parties in 1984 effectively bars 
appellant's current claim for permanent and total disability. 
12 
POINT III 
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF INTERPRETING AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT WHICH 
IS UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE. 
Following his industrial injury of April 14, 1980, 
Mr. Wilburn received from the defendants both temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability benefits. The 
latter benefits were paid in accordance with the finding of Dr. 
W. E. Hess, the doctor to whom appellant had been referred for 
an independent medical examination. Dr. Hess found that Mr. 
Wilburn had a 20 percent whole man impairment, 15 percent of 
which he attributed to pre-existing causes and 5 percent of 
which he attributed to Mr. Wilburn's industrial injury. (R. 
at 18 0, 3 06.) Unfortunately, Mr. Wilburn's condition 
continued to deteriorate following his examination by Dr. 
Hess. When his previous benefits terminated, Mr. Wilburn 
again contacted National Union and requested additional 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability 
benefits. After receiving Mr. Wilburn1s request, National 
Union referred Mr. Wilburn to Dr. Hess a second time to 
obtain an updated opinion on his physical condition. After his 
second examination, Dr. Hess raised Mr. 
partial disability rating to 35 percent 
Although Dr. Hess found Mr. Wilburnfs impairment to have 
increased, National Union failed to reinstate Mr. Wilburn's 
benefits. Finally, on February 9, 1984, the claims 
Wilburn's permanent 
whole man. (R at 189.) 
13 
representative for National Union requested that Mr. Wilburn 
meet with its counsel, Mr. Stuart Poelman, to discuss his 
case. (R at 31.) During the course of this meeting, Mr. 
Wilburn asked Mr. Poelman whether the respondents would be 
willing to pay him an additional 10 percent permanent partial 
disability based upon the added deterioration he had 
experienced. (R at 322, 323.) Mr. Wilburn also asked Mr. 
Poelman if he should assert a claim for permanent and total 
disability. Mr. Poelman appropriately replied that he could 
not advise appellant on this issue since to do so would place 
him in a conflict of interest. (R. at 322) . Thereafter, the 
parties engaged in further discussions and negotiations which 
eventually resulted in the execution of the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement at issue herein. During the course of 
these negotiations and prior to signing the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Wilburn completed and filed with 
the Commission an Application for Hearing dated June 15, 1984. 
This application was never processed due to the compromise 
finally agreed upon by the parties. 
The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was executed 
by the parties in or around November, 1984. Since that time, 
Mr. Wilburn1s condition has continued to deteriorate, thus 
resulting in his current claim for permanent and total 
disability. Although the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
does not discuss the issue of permanent and total disability 
anywhere within its four corners, respondents contend that it 
was intended to be a full and final settlement of all of Mr. 
14 
Wilburn1s claims arising out of his industrial injury and 
that his claim for permanent and total disability is, 
therefore, barred. The Administrative Law Judge originally 
ruled in favor of Mr. Wilburn on this issue but following a 
Motion for Review by the respondents, he reversed his previous 
decision and held that Mr. Wilburn's claim is barred. This 
finding was subsequently upheld by the 
In reaching the conclusion tljiat the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement effectively bars Mr. Wilburn1s current 
claim, the Administrative Law Judge clearly relied upon 
testimony solicited at the time of the hearing regarding the 
discussions and negotiations engaged in by the parties prior to 
Commission. 
execution of the final document. This 
reviewing his Supplemental Findings of 
and Order dated July 2, 1986. In fact, 
Judge specifically states therein: 
fact is evident in 
Fact, Conclusions of Law 
i the Administrative Law 
Because of the particular circumstances 
under which the Compromise anjd Settlement 
Agreement of November 28, 19814 was 
executed, and subsequently apbroved by 
Legal Counsel for the Commission, the 
Administrative Law Judge is constrained to 
reverse his prior determination and find 
that the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement was validly executed by the 
parties as a Settlement of a pisputed Claim 
and was not in violation of §t35-l-90, 
U.C.A. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 374.) (See also Copy of Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order attaphed hereto as Addendum 
Exhibit B.) 
It is a long standing rule of evidence in cases of 
contract interpretation that parol evidence is inadmissible to 
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vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract 
unambiguous on its face. In Youngren v. John W. Lloyd 
Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985, (1969) the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
When parties have negotiated on a subject 
and have thereafter entered into a written 
contract, it should be assumed that their 
prior negotiations are fused into the 
contract so that it represents their full 
agreement with respect thereto; and that, 
consequently, after its due execution, 
extraneous evidence should ordinarily not 
be permitted to add to, subtract from, 
vary, or contradict it. (footnote omitted.) 
Id. at 987. 
The same rule identified in Youngren was 
reiterated in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
In Lamb the court stated: 
Evidence of any prior oral agreement, which 
contradicts the plain terms of the written 
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol 
evidence rule, for a party may not 
establish a different contract on facts 
known at the time of reducing their 
understanding to written form. All 
preliminary negotiations, conversations, 
and verbal agreements are merged m and 
superseded by the subsequent written 
contract, and unless frauds accident or 
mistake be averred, the writing constitutes 
the agreement between the parties, and its 
terms cannot be altered by parol 
evidence. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote 
omitted.) 
Lamb at 607. See also Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah 
1978) ("The rule is well established, evidence of prior 
negotiations is inadmissible to contradict terms of a final 
instrument.11) 
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In the instant case, it is ciear that the 1984 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement was adopted by the parties 
as the final and complete expression oj: their oral agreement. 
The Agreement thus constitutes an integrated contract and parol 
evidence may not be introduced to vary or add to its express 
terms. See Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 635 P.2d 1190, 
1194 (Utah 1981) and Union Bank v. Sweijison, 707 P. 2d 663, 
665 (Utah 1985) . 
A review of the express language of the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement which is the Subject of this 
litigation reveals only a compromise of appellant's claim for 
additional temporary total disability 4nd permanent partial 
disability benefits. The term permanerit total disability 
benefits is not mentioned even one timd within the four corners 
of the document. Thus, it is clear thajt the Administrative Law 
Judge's finding that the Agreement was intended to settle a 
claim for permanent and total disability came from sources 
extraneous to the agreement itself. Sihce according to the 
express terms of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the 
parties were only settling Mr. Wilburn'£ claim for additional 
permanent partial and temporary total disability benefits, the 
Administrative Law Judge's reliance upoi^  parol evidence in 
interpreting the contract was improper ^nd contrary to law. 
Furthermore, because the Agreement make^ no express or implied 
reference to a settlement of Mr. Wilburrt's right to claim 
permanent and total disability, it does not preclude Mr. 
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Wilburn from asserting a claim for permanent and total 
disability at the present time. 
POINT IV 
ANY ALLEGED AMBIGUITIES IN THE COMPROMISE AND 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. 
Assuming arguendo that the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement contains ambiguities, those ambiguities should be 
resolved in favor of Mr. Wilburn. Two reasons militate in 
favor of this position. First, counsel for respondent National 
Union was responsible for the drafting of the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement and second, Mr. Wilburn was not 
represented by counsel in negotiating and executing the 
Agreement. 
It is a well-established rule in contract law that 
" . . . any uncertainty with respect to construction of a 
contract should be resolved against the party who [drew] the 
agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 
1982). See also Matter of Estate of Orris, 622 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah 1980). In the instant case, Stuart Poelman, 
counsel for National Union, drafted the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement at issue. As previously stated, the 
Agreement contains no language, express or implied, which 
purports to settle Mr. Wilburn1s claim for permanent and 
total disability. In alleging that this was the actual intent 
of the Agreement respondents point to the negotiations 
preceding execution of the final document. Not once do they 
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cite the language of the Agreement itself. This fact is 
significant inasmuch as the very purpose of reducing an oral 
agreement to writing is to specifically identify and preserve 
the terms agreed upon by them. Because counsel for National 
Union was the drafting party and becauqe he had been personally 
involved in all of the discussions and (negotiations leading up 
to the execution of the final document, National Union had more 
than ample opportunity to draft the agreement so that it 
clearly reflected the rights and claims! each party was 
relinquishing. In spite of the opportunity it had to 
specifically identify and preclude any future assertion of a 
claim for permanent and total disability, however, the 
respondents failed to even so much as Mention the subject of 
permanent and total disability. Furthe!rmore, respondents 
failed to include any provision which mjight arguably serve as a 
catch all barring any and all future cljaims Mr. Wilburn might 
assert. The respondents' failure to either discuss the issue 
of permanent and total disability or identify the Agreement as 
a full and final settlement of all claims which might be raised 
by the appellant is, at the very least, odd in view of 
respondents claim that permanent and total disability was the 
very heart and soul of the negotiations leading to execution of 
the final document. It is hard to belifeve that experienced 
counsel would fail to include even so m^ ich as a passing 
reference to the very claim allegedly settled as a result of 
the parties1 oral negotiations. 
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Additional doubt is cast upon the position of the 
respondents in view of Mr. Wilburn's contention that at the 
time he executed the Agreement in question it was his 
understanding the only claims he was compromising were his then 
current claims for additional temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability benefits based upon the additional 
deterioration he had experienced in his physical condition 
since the payment of his previous award. (R. at 77.) 
Defendants refer to Mr. Wilburn's testimony in this regard as 
"self serving", however, it is no more "self serving" than the 
position taken by respondents, especially in view of the 
opportunities available to the respondents to clearly and 
unquestionably preclude the very claim Mr. Wilburn is now 
asserting. Additionally, Mr. Wilburn's understanding of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement is supported not only by 
his own testimony but also by language in the Agreement 
itself. For example, while the Agreement does not discuss 
permanent and total disability, it does specifically identify 
Mr. Wilburn's claims for temporary total and permanent 
partial disability and medical benefits. Also, in Paragraph 3 
of the Agreement, it states: 
The Employer and The Fund agree that The 
Fund will reimburse the Employer for 
two-thirds of all future medical expense 
and temporary total disability for which 
liability to the applicant may be incurred. 
Admittedly, this language refers only to an agreement between 
the Employer and the Fund. However, to the untrained eye of a 
layman not represented by counsel, this language could 
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reasonably be viewed as evidence that IJie would not be precluded 
from asserting a future claim should h^s condition continue to 
worsen inasmuch as the Employer and Th^ Fund were apparently 
contemplating the possibility of incurring future liability on 
his behalf. 
The second factor militating in favor of construing 
any potential ambiguities in the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement in favor of the appellant is the fact that Mr. 
Wilburn was not represented by counsel Iduring either the 
course of negotiations or at the time o|f execution of the final 
written document. Although respondents! state that Mr. 
Wilburn consulted with Janet Moffitt, Robert Shaughnes^y 
and Shaun Howell before signing the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement, a review of the record reveals that Mr. 
Wilburn1 s conversations with Janet Moffitt took place well 
before he ever met with Mr. Poelman about his claim. (R. at 
122, 123.) Mr. Wilburn admittedly consulted with Robert 
Shaughnessy about his case on one occasion, but this 
consultation, too, took place before any negotiations were 
undertaken with Mr. Poelman. Furthermore, Mr. Wilburn did 
not seek any advice from Mr. Shaughnessy regarding the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement unt^l sometime after tne 
Agreement had already been signed. (R. at 124.) Thus, the 
only legal counsel with whom Mr. Wilburii spoke directly about 
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was Stuart Poelman, 
counsel for the employer and insurer, arid Shaun Howell, legal 
counsel to the Commission. It is obvious from the very fact 
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that this litigation has arisen, that the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement meant something different to Mr. Wilburn 
than it did to Mr. Poelman, its drafter, especially with 
regard to the language appearing in paragraph three as 
aforementioned. Ms. Howell, on the other hand, specifically 
stated that she did not advise Mr. Wilburn one way or the 
other regarding the advisability of signing the Agreement. (R. 
at 138.) In essence, all she did was advise him on the 
"possibilities." (R. at 143.) It is unclear from her 
testimony the extent to which she may have actually discussed 
the particular language of the Agreement itself with Mr. 
Wilburn and any possible questions he may have had in this 
regard. However, during cross examination Ms. Howell was 
specifically asked whether she ever discussed the 
aforementioned paragraph three with Mr. Wilburn. Her reply 
was that she doubted very much she had discussed that portion 
of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement with him. (R. at 
150.) In view of these facts and circumstances and in view of 
the fact that Mr. Wilburn is not trained in the subtleties of 
the law, both law and equity require any ambiguities in the 
written document to be interpreted most strictly against the 
respondents. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah law specifically provides that an employee 
cannot waive his rights to worker's compensation benefits. In 
the instant case, the respondents allege that the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn in November of 
1984 bars his current claim for permanent and total 
disability. Purported settlement agreements in the area of 
worker's compensation are valid only iff the compensable nature 
of the applicant's claim is truly doubtful. The facts and 
circumstances giving rise to Mr. Wilburn's injury do not 
render his claim doubtful under the la\^  as it existed at the 
time the Compromise and Settlement Agrelement was negotiated and 
thus the Agreement is invalid. 
Should the Court determine thle Agreement to be valid, 
however, it should be noted that it does not purport to bar Mr. 
Wilburn's claim for permanent total disability benefits 
either expressly or by implication. Because the Agreement is 
unambiguous on its face, it must be strictly construed in 
accordance with its express terms. Furthermore, any facial 
ambiguities within the document itself Should be resolved in 
favor of the applicant as he was the noil-drafting party and 
he was not represented by counsel at the time it was executed. 
Thus, the decision of the Commission denying Mr. Wilburn 
permanent total disability should be reversed and his claim for 
permanent and total disability should be! allowed. 
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EXHIBIT A 
- BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTj$'7; \l •'* 
• • • • • • 
Case No. 810009b9 • • • : "•*•-
GILBERT WILBURN, 
Applicant-Employee, 
VS. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Employee-Carrier. 
THIS AGREEMENT entered into this d|ate by and between 
Gilbert R. Wilburn (hereinafter called "Applicant"), Inter-
state Electric and National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter 
collectively called "Employer"), and Tljie Second Injury Fund 
(hereinafter collectively called "The ^und"), 
WHEREAS, Applicant claims to have Sustained an injury by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment 
with Interstate Electric on April 14, l|980fl and 
I 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have previously entered into 
a compensation agreement pursuant to wh|ich certain workmen1 s 
compensation benefits have been paid to| the applicant and 
pursuant to which an order for reimbursement has been entered 
# • • • • • • 
• • • • - » - » • - > • • • • 
•" • • • • • - * - > 
• • • • • • 
by the Commission whereby The Fund has been ordered to reim-
burse the Employer for 75% of all medical expensestaYjd! tje&i- I II • I 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
porary total disability benefits paid, and 
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he is entitled to 
additional benefits but the Employer and The Fund dispute 
said claim and also deny liability for any benefits which 
have been paid or are yet claimed by Applicant under the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act, and 
WHEREAS, the Employer has paid to or on behalf of Appli-
cant temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits 
in the total sum of $41,054.66 for which the Fund has not yet 
reimbursed the Employer for its pro rata share, and 
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that there exists a 
serious and disputed question as to whether or not the 
Employer is liable to the Applicant for any benefits under 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, and 
WHEREAS, it is the intent and desire of the Applicant, 
the Employer and The Fund that the said claim of the Appli-
cant be compromised and settled so as to avoid the necessity 
of further litigation, and 
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement have carefully 
considered their respective positions with respect to said 
claims and have concluded that the settlement of claims 
herein made is fair and equitable in every respect* 
-2-
?Sft 
NOW, THEREFORE, in reliance of tt}e foregoing recitals and 
• • • • * •** • • 
in consideration of the following terims and obligations^ 5:he • •"•'•* 
• • • • > • • - • • 
parties agree: 
1. Employer shall pay to Applicant the additional sum 
of $1,590.00 representing additional temporary total disa-
bility plus the sum of $2,184.00 representing an additional 
5% permanent partial disability over ^nd above those amounts 
which it has already paid to Applicant. 
2. . The Fund shall pay to Applicant the sum of $2,184.0C 
representing an additional 5% permanent partial disability 
over and above those amount which The |Fund has already paid 
to Applicant. 
3. The Fund shall reimburse the Employer for two-thirds 
of all temporary total disability and Medical benefits here-
tofore and now paid by the Employer fof which the Employer 
has not yet received any reimbursement from The Fund, which 
two-thirds reimbursement is calculated to be in the total sum 
of $28,429.77. The Employer and The FUnd agree that The Fund 
will reimburse the Employer for two-thilrds of all future 
medical expense and temporary total disability for which 
liability to the Applicant may be incurred. 
4. It is understood and agreed by and between the par-
ties that this Agreement constitutes a cpompromise of a dis-
puted claim and does not constitute an admission of any fact, 
contention or liability on the part of ^ny of the parties. 
-3-
• « • • • • • 
• • • • • » * » • • > • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• *  • • • 
5. This Agreement shall become binding and effective 
only when approved by the Industrial Commission cJfTCltfah,: : • : : r.#i 
• • • • • • • • - • * 
• • • • « • • • • • * 
DATED this day of _, 1984. 
APPLICANT: 
Gilbert R. Wilburn 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCI 
-r 
THE SECOND INJURY FUNR: 
Approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah: 
_ W/A rtw, . 
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By Diapa M. Hocking 
EXHIBIT B 
- ^ : 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ^ . ...
 g 7 
\ 
^DWii / 
Case No. 86000196 \W 
GILBERT R. WILBURN, * SUPPLEMENTAL 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or * AND ORDER 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF * 
PITTSBURGH and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered 
in this matter on May 28, 1986. A Motion for Review was timely filed by the 
Defendants on June 13, 1986. Part of the Motion sought clarification of 
various portions of the Order, but the Administrative Law Judge is 
particularly concerned with that part of the Motion which seeks a reversal of 
the basic determination relative to the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
entered into between the parties on November 28, 1984. Applicant's response 
to the Motion has also been considered. 
As stated in the original Findings of Fact, the Administrative Law 
Judge believes the Applicant's claim is controlled by the holdings in the two 
cases cited in the original Findings. These cases are Briftham Young 
University v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 279 P 889 (1929) and Barber Asphalt 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 103 Utah 371, 135 P2d 266, (1943). The BYU 
case approved a Stipulation and Settlement of j a Disputed Claim where the 
compensability of the claim was a close issue. 
The Court explained in the BYU caie what was meant by the 
compensability of the claim being a close issue by stating it was one 
"concerning which reasonable minds may well diffej:, and where the right of the 
Applicant to recover is doubtful." Although the I Settlement Agreement entered 
into was invalidated by the Court, the decision in the Barber Asphalt case is 
consistent with the BYU case. In the Barber Asphalt case, there was no issue 
as to the fact that the Applicant's injury arose out of or in the course of 
his employment as a result of a compensable industrial accident. This was in 
sharp contrast to the BYU case in which the Court specifically stated the 
compensability of the claim was a close issue Tconcerning which reasonable 
minds might well differ and the right of th^ Applicant to recover was 
doubtful." 
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In the original Order, the Administrative Law Judge expressed his 
opinion that there was no doubt as to the compensability of the Applicant's* 
claim. Upon further reflection, the Administrative Law Judge would still find 
the Applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident. But the critical 
issue now seems to be not so much what the finding of the Administrative Law 
Judge would have been in retrospect, but whether such a finding, made at this 
time, can supplant the previous Compromise and Settlement Agreement which, on 
its face, constituted a Compromise and Settlement Agreement of a disputed 
claim. 
In his Motion for Review, Counsel for the Defendants has correctly 
stated that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement of November 28, 1984, was 
(1) entered into between the parties in good faith, (2) the parties stipulated 
that there v/as a bonafide issue as to the compensability of the Applicant's 
claim at the time of said Agreement, (3) there was a specific finding in the 
original Order of May 28, 1986, that the Defendants acted in good faith in 
asserting the defense of "no accident" in connection with the Agreement, and 
(4) the Agreement was approved by the Industrial Commission's Legal Counsel. 
The Settlement of any claim is usually a desirable objective. The 
settlement of a disputed claim is particularly desirable because an 
adjudication of the claim seldom satisfies both parties and frequently leads 
to appeals and delays that thwart the beneficent purposes of workmen's 
compensation legislation. The policy of the Commission has been, and should 
continue to be, one that encourages the settlement of claims. It has been the 
longstanding practice of the Industrial Commission to approve settlements. 
This practice has operated as a safeguard against abuses that might otherwise 
occur, if an unscrupulous employer or insurance carrier attempted to take 
advantage of an unsophisticated worker seeking to settle a claim without the 
advice of counsel. The practice also affords some protection against clerical 
errors in the calculation of benefits payable to an Applicant. 
In Mr. Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did discuss his claim 
with an attorney, but at the time he signed the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement, he was not represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the Commission's Le'gal Counsel, who 
approved the Settlement after discussing all of its ramifications with the 
Applicant. Based upon the testimony of the Commission's former legal counsel 
who approved this particular Agreement, and based upon the Applicant's own 
testimony, there can be little doubt that the Applicant gave long and serious 
consideration to the execution of this Agreement. This was not an Agreement 
that was prepared on the spur of the moment and signed hastily. It was, in 
fact, prepared weeks, if not months, before it was actually executed. By his 
own admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement was signed, was 
extremely concerned about ensuring a continuation of his medical benefits 
which were assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement. If not, there is no doubt that the Applicant understood the 
possibility of losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim on the issue 
of "no accident." The Applicant had previously received substantial 
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compensation benefits and was offered additional benefits, as well as a 
continuation of his medical benefits. 
Under the foregoing circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the issue is perhaps not so much a matter 
of whether the Administrative Law Judge believes the Applicant sustained a 
compensable industrial accident as it is a matter of what the parties believed 
and acted upon, at the time the Compensation Agreement was executed* The 
Defendants were undoubtedly relying upon the information furnished the 
insurance adjustor by the Applicant on May 22J 1980, at which time, the 
adjustor took a recorded statement as to how the injury occurred and the 
timing of the pain the Applicant felt in connection with his injury. This 
statement is not in evidence, but it does provide some understanding of the 
Defendant's point of view. The transcript does not change the opinion of the 
Administrative Law Judge.as to the compensability of the Applicant's claim, 
but it does help explain why the Applicant elected to execute the Agreement 
rather than submit his claim to the Commission for adjudication. 
Because of the particular circumstances under which the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement of November 28, 1984 was! executed, and subsequently 
approved by Legal Counsel for the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge is 
constrained to reverse his prior determination and find that the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement was validly executed by the parties as a Settlement 
of a Disputed Claim and was not in violation of Section 35-1-90, U.C.A. The 
Administrative Law Judge realizes the harsn consequences of this 
determination. Mr. Wilburn is a very likeable person and is undoubtedly in 
need of whatever benefits or compensation he can optain. However, compassion 
for the Applicant does not justify the erosion of a principle and policy 
pertaining to Compensation Agreements generally. As stated in the original 
Order, the award of compensation could only be justified if reasonable minds 
could not differ as to the compensability of the Applicant's claim. The fact 
that the Administrative Law Judge would have no difficulty in finding the 
Applicant's claim compensable does not, at this time, supplant the judgment of 
those who earlier, in good faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful 
compensability. The Applicant had pondered the effect of the Agreement for 
several months and had discussed the same fully with the Commission's Legal 
Counsel and with an attorney. To invalidate the Agreement at this time would 
seriously undermine the entire settlement process, rendering such so uncertain 
and unpredictable as to seldom be worthy of serious consideration. 
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For the reasons stated above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Interim Order of May 28, 1986, be, and 
the same is hereby, vacated and set aside and the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement entered into between the parties and approved by the Commission on 
November 28, 1984, is deemed binding upon the parties, precluding the 
Applicant from asserting a claim at this time. Having vacated the prior 
Order, the other matters in the original Interim Order on which the Defendants 
sought clarification are now moot. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
_day of Juno, 1986 
ATTEST 
Linda J. Sirp^burg 
Commissidp Secretary 
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Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Gilbert R. Wilburn issued July JL 1986 
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Law and Order in the case of 
, was mailed to the following 
Gilbert R. Wilburn, 1920 South 50 West,, Bountiful, UT 84010 
Michael E. Dyer, Atty., P.O. Box 2465, SLC, UT 84110 
Stuart L. Poelman, Atty., P.O. Box 30001, SLC, UT 84110 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator Second Injury Fund 
National Union Fire Insurance Company ot Pittsburgh, c/o American 
International Adjusting, P.O. Box 6159, SLC, UT 84106 
Interstate Electric, 1000 West Center Street, North Salt Lake 
UT 84054 
THE INDUStRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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